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A Response to Russell Pearce by 
John Humbach 
by John A. Humbach* 
There is not very much to criticize in what Professor 
Pearcel has said about the MacCrate R e p ~ r t . ~  Mostly, there- 
fore, I will just amplify some of the points that I regard as  
among the most important. Before that, however, I want to 
mention some quibbles. 
First, I have always been bothered a bit when people de- 
scribe the lawyer's role as that of a hired gun.3 The term "hired 
gun" is (if you'll pardon the expression) loaded. It does not, 
moreover, correctly capture either the good or the questionable 
of what lawyers actually try to do when representing their cli- 
ents. Real hired guns are, by definition, persons willing to do 
violence to the law, or at least to do violence. A willingness to 
do violence or to break the law is not, however, characteristic of 
lawyers. On the contrary, lawyers almost uniformly see their 
role as seeking to obtain their clients' goals within the bounda- 
ries set by the law, and lawyers certainly do not typically see 
themselves as  open to doing violent acts. 
What the "hired gun" metaphor attempts to capture is, I 
think, the fact that lawyers often try to help their clients obtain 
a legal advantage (or avoid a disadvantage) that the substance 
of the law does not warrant. This is a problem, as I will discuss 
a bit later,4 but the problem is not that the lawyer intentionally 
goes beyond the limits that the law or lawyer ethics prescribe. 
At another point Professor Pearce has made an analogy be- 
tween sports figures and lawyers, and with that I must also 
* Professor of Law, Pace University. B.A., Miami University (1963); J.D. 
summa cum laude, The Ohio State University (1966). 
1. Russell G. Pearce, MacCrate's Missed Opportunity: The MacCrate Report's 
Failure to Advance Professional Values, 23 PACE L. REV. 575 (2003). 
2. A.B.A., L E ~ T  ~I 'UCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT-AN EDUCA- 
TIONAL CONTINUUM-REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PRO- 
FESSION: NARROWING THE GAP (1992) [hereinafter MacCrate Report]. 
3. Pearce, supra note 1, a t  591. 
4. See infia text accompanying notes 24, 27-36. 
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quibble. He observes that nobody much cares when a star ath- 
lete is a lamentable role model, as long as the athlete "continues 
to  star," and he considers this phenomenon to be evidence that 
people tend to rank skills ahead of  value^.^ This ordering of 
skills over values is, in his view, particularly unfortunate when 
done in evaluating lawyers, as he thinks the MacCrate authors 
have done. I am not so sure the MacCrate authors have in fact 
mis-ordered skills and values,6 but in any case the analogy of 
lawyers to athletes is questionable. The crucial distinction is 
that an athlete's role-model shortcomings typically have little to 
do with the athlete's professional excellence on the field while, 
by contrast, our concern with lawyers' ethics is almost entirely 
concerned with their behavior qua lawyers. Indeed, when an 
athlete is caught up in a scandal that does go to the essence of 
the sport, people tend to be very critical. Remember Rosie Ruiz, 
the woman who came out of nowhere to win the 1980 Boston 
Marathon? Who can forget how roundly she was condemned 
when it turned out later that she had traveled most of the route 
on the subway.7 She broke the rules and we did not laud her 
victory, just as we would not laud a lawyer who breaks the legal 
or ethical rules in pursuit of a client's interests. 
Another quibble relates more directly to Professor Pearce's 
criticism of the MacCrate authors' decision to place the discus- 
sion of values after skills in the Report. Professor Pearce stated 
that, by such placement, the report "signaled" that values have 
a lower priority than skills8 in the MacCrate pantheon. The re- 
port's authors deny any such prioritization and they have an 
explanation for their ordering of the discussion.9 The reason for 
analyzing skills first, the authors say, is that a familiarity with 
the various skills is essential to a proper understanding of the 
values.lO For example, the Report asserts, "familiarity with 
5 .  Pearce, supra note 1, a t  586. 
6. See infra text accompanying notes 8-10. 
7. Dick Heller, Ruiz Ended Up as Big Loser in  '80 Boston Marathon Ruse, THE 
WASH. TIMES, Apr. 21, 2003, a t  C12. 
8. Pearce, supra note 1, a t  586. 
9. "[Tlhe order in which skills or values are presented does not reflect any 
views about their relative importance in the practice of law or in the process of 
preparing for practice." MacCrate Report, supra note 2, a t  137. 
10. Id. a t  135-37. 
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Skill $5 1-10 is essential for understanding the ideal of compe- 
tent representation which is discussed in Value $ 1."11 
I have an example of my own. Consider the MacCrate Re- 
port's Value § 2, entitled "Striving to  promote justice, fairness, 
and morality."12 A person is likely to  misunderstand Value $ 2 
unless he or she has first taken account of what the MacCrate 
Report regards as included in (and excluded from) the lawyer's 
fundamental skill of "problem solving."l3 The text of Value 5 2 
states that lawyers should be committed to "counseling clients 
to take considerations of justice, fairness, and morality in ac- 
count" in the client's decisions and actions14-undoubtedly a fine 
commitment. Yet, the MacCrate Report's detailed description 
of the problem solving task, in Skill $ 1, is barren of any sugges- 
tion that lawyers should make any effort at all to  figure out 
what the relevant "considerations of justice, fairness, and mo- 
rality" might be.15 One wonders: How much impact can the law- 
yer's commitment to  justice, fairness, and morality really have 
unless such considerations are treated as an integral part of the 
"problem" the lawyer is supposed to solve? 
The Report's description of the problem solving skill is piv- 
otal because, presumably, it reflects the authors' general view of 
what kinds of "problems" are important to carrying out the law- 
yer's essential role. A crucial early step in problem solving- 
likely to delimit the potential of everything that follows-is 
"generating alternative solutions and strategies."l6 However, 
when a lawyer is making "an inventory of the full range of alter- 
native possible solutions," the only express requirement is that 
the lawyer include those alternatives that are "consistent with 
the practicalities of the client's situation."l7 One is left simply 
to wonder: What about the practicalities of others' situations. 
Do the legitimate interests of persons other than the client have 
any central place in the lawyer's thinking? Or is the scope of 
the lawyer's role (and problem solving) essentially confined to  
11. Id. 
12. Id. a t  213-15. 
13. See MacCrate Report, supra note 2, at 141-51 (Fundamental Skill § 1). 
14. MacCrate Report, supra note 2, a t  213 (Value § 2.l(b)). 
15. See MacCrate Report, supra note 2, a t  141-48. 
16. MacCrate Report, supra note 2, a t  14-43. 
17. MacCrate Report, supra note 2, a t  144. 
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assuring "justice, fairness, and morality" only towards one's 
own client? 
At this point, I suppose, many lawyers might be inclined to 
take strong exception-perhaps echoing the lines of Lord 
Brougham's infamous dictum that "hazards and costs to other 
persons . . ." are of no concern to the advocate, who "must not 
regard the alarm, the torments, the destruction which he may 
bring upon others."ls Maybe this is so, but, if it is, then the 
"value" of promoting justice, fairness, and morality has, in prac- 
tice, a rather crabbed and abnormal meaning. Nevertheless, 
that is indeed the meaning that seems to emerge if one seeks an 
"understanding" of Value $ 2 by reference to the prior discus- 
sion of the problem solving Skill $ 1, as described in the Mac- 
Crate Report. 
Indeed, the MacCrate Report does not shrink from such a 
reading. It appears to assume, as do most lawyers, that a law- 
yer's work should be almost entirely aimed at "obtaining the 
most beneficial consequences for the ~lient.'~lS As Professor 
Pearce points out, "[mlost lawyers view themselves as advo- 
cates who pursue the self-interest of their clients single- 
mindedly."20 
There are, however, certainly other possible ways to view 
the lawyer's role, for example as a "peacemaker," advocated by 
former Chief Justice Warren Burger. "In their highest role," 
the late Chief Justice wrote, "lawyers should be the healers of 
conflicts and, as such, should help the diverse parts of a com- 
plex, pluralistic social order function with a minimum of fric- 
tion. Lawsuits ought to  be the last resort-like war."21 Quoting 
Abraham Lincoln, the Chief Justice continued: "'Discourage liti- 
gation. Persuade your neighbors to compromise whenever you 
can. Point out to them how the nominal winner is often a real 
18. Lord Henry Brougham statement in connection with his defense in the 
trial of Queen Caroline, quoted in STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF LAWYERS 395 
(6th ed. 2002). 
19. MacCrate Report, supra note 2, a t  149 (in Commentary to Skill 5 1 Prob- 
lem Solving, quoting David R. Barnhizer, The Clinical Method of Legal Instruction: 
Its Theory and Implementation, 30 J .  LEGAL EDUC. 67, 77 (1979)). 
20. Pearce, supra note 1, a t  591. 
21. Warren E. Burger, Remarks of Warren E. Burger, Chief Justice of the 
United States at the Dedication of Notre Dame London Law Centre: The Role of the 
Lawyer Today, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1983). 
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loser-in fees, expenses, and waste of time. As a peace-maker 
the lawyer has a superior opportunity of being a good man."'22 
In other words, a lawyer's focus should not be to "pursue the 
self-interest of their clients single-mindedly" but, instead, it is 
also properly part of the lawyer's "problem solving" to deter- 
mine how the legitimate interests of others might best be coor- 
dinated with the client's own goals and aims. As a peacemaker, 
a lawyer would try to bring people together, truly to resolve dis- 
putes-not just bring the coercive force of the law down on ad- 
verse parties so they will back away from their disputations. In 
our exaggerated version of the adversary system, however, us- 
ing the law to drive opponents into submission is precisely what 
many think they should do. In the prevailing conception of the 
adversary system we are not our brothers' keepers; we have no 
role in "promoting justice, fairness, and morality" to them. 
I strongly agree with Professor Pearce that the MacCrate 
Report missed a key opportunity when it failed to provide a 
strategy for countering this prevailing understanding of the 
lawyer's r0le.~3 Essentially, the Report contents itself with ob- 
serving that "[wlhen, as often happens, [that] a lawyer en- 
counters a situation in which some of the options available for 
solving a client's problem would result in unfairness or injustice 
to others, the lawyer should counsel the client to act in a man- 
ner 'that is morally just."'24 What, however, does this mean? 
What if, for example, a lawyer can get the client a result she 
would be more or less satisfied with while fully meeting the con- 
cerns ofjustice, fairness, and morality all around, but also has a 
shot at  getting even more. Perhaps the lawyer sees a way to  get 
the client 100% of her fondest dreams even though, according to 
the substance of the law, she would be warranted in receiving 
only ninety percent. Or, a lawyer might see a way to get the 
client an unwarranted legal advantage by employing means 
that are legal but, shall we say, morally questionable-such as 
by moving to exclude evidence that is truthful but "harmful" to 
the client's interest. What should the lawyer do? 
22. Id. (quoting Abraham Lincoln, Notes for Law Lecture (July 1, 18501, in I1 
COMPLETE WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 142 (J. Nicolay & J. Hay eds., 1894)). 
23. See, e.g., Pearce, supra note 1, a t  590-91. 
24. MacCrate Report, supra note 2, a t  214. 
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Here is an example. Suppose the client is selling his house, 
and the contract calls for an engineer's report, dated no earlier 
than five days before the closing, showing the furnace to be in 
working order. Suppose such a report has been prepared, and it 
is ready for delivery at  the closing. Suppose then the client tells 
the lawyer confidentially that, following the engineer's inspec- 
tion, the furnace conked out, and it has to be repaired. The law- 
yer knows that, at worst, the client would only have to knock a 
few hundred dollars off the sales price, or agree to put an 
amount into escrow and pay for the repair. But the client wants 
it all, now. The client wants to close the deal (take the buyer's 
money) in silence. Because of the small amount involved, there 
is virtually no chance of repercussions. There is respectable au- 
thority to the effect that the lawyer would commit no legal 
wrong by going ahead with the client's wishes.25 What would 
you do? 
From the description of problem solving in the MacCrate 
Report, this situation does not seem even to raise a "problem" 
within the scope of the lawyer's problem solving, at least none 
that a lawyer would have to consider. Only a lawyer could see 
"justice, fairness, and morality" in this way, of course, but this 
is the way many of us see them. Isn't it? 
I mentioned earlier Professor Pearce's observation that the 
MacCrate Report seems to  rank skills over values. However, 
the descriptions of skills in the Report are in fact packed with 
values-embedded with values. That is to say, each of the vari- 
ous skills is, without exception, a skill for pursuing some partic- 
ular values. The problem is this: The values that are embedded 
in the MacCrate Report skills may not be the law's values, but 
they may instead be the values of an insular profession-a pro- 
fession that takes it upon itself to frustrate the values expressed 
in the substantive law whenever doing so might serve a client's 
private interests. 
25. Schatz v. Rosenberg, 943 F.2d 485 (4th Cir. 1991). Holding that defrauded 
party in a sale of stock has no cause of action against lawyers who "failed to tattle 
on their client for misrepresenting his personal financial condition." Id. at 491 
(citing Barker v. Henderson, 797 F.2d 490, 497 (7th Cir.1986) ("Neither lawyers 
nor accountants are required to tattle on their clients in the absence of some duty 
to disclose. To the contrary, attorneys have privileges not to disclose.")). 
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When I hear suggestions that more should be done about 
teaching values in law school, I am always a little astonished. I 
would have thought off hand that the law is just about all val- 
ues, and that the teaching of law is basically nothing but the 
teaching of values.26 So when the MacCrate Report counsels 
the teaching of values, the question that naturally arises is, 
which values? Should the emphasis in law school be on lawyer 
values or the values of the law? Should we stress the values of 
"self-interested advocates who pursue the self-interest of their 
clients single-mindedly" or the values of "justice, fairness, and 
morality" that are embedded in the law, values that exist for the 
benefit of all and not just our clients? 
Stating this question differently, what should law schools 
be telling the students that the lawyer's job is: to try to get the 
client whatever the client wants (as long as the means are legal 
and permitted by lawyer ethics) or to  work towards achieving 
the gold standard of legal justice-the substance of the law, ap- 
plied to the events that actually occurred? Is it the lawyer's job 
to try, if possible, to get a legal advantage for the client that the 
substance of the law does not mean for the client to have, even 
at the cost of substantive justice to another? 
These are the bread and butter issues: A client comes in 
and says "I've caused some big harm, and I don't want to have 
to pay damages." Or, "I've made this contract, and I want you to 
find me a way to get out of it." Or "I've been written out of 
mom's will, but I want you to see if you can get me something 
anyhow." Or "My neighbor has this easement over my land; I 
want you to  get rid of it." The situations are endless. Some- 
times the lawyer will tell the client that there is no case; that 
putting up a fight would be frivolous.27 What if, however, the 
lawyer sees a way to prevail-by taking advantage of some pro- 
cedural wrinkle or  by a making a flat-out play on one or more of 
the well-known imperfections of that most human of systems, 
the legal system?2* 
26. I should specify here that I am referring primarily to the substance of the 
law and not so much the procedural machinery that exists to carry out the intend- 
ment of that substance. 
27. And, of course, a violation of the lawyer's ethics. See MODEL RULES OF 
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (2002). 
28. For a more extended discussion of opportunistic advocacy based on the 
imperfections in the law and legal system, especially its procedures for finding 
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The values we inculcate in students are often inherent in 
the way we teach. In our "Socratic" dialogues, what do we tell 
our students to ask themselves when faced with a difficult case 
or  hypothetical? Don't we tell them to ask: "If this were our 
client, what could we do for her? What are the possibilities? 
Here is a person with a serious legal problem; how can we get 
her out of it-so she won't suffer the consequences that the law 
prescribes for what she did?" 
Of course, posing questions like these may be one of the 
most effective ways to make students bear down on a problem, 
to make them really think. Nonetheless, as we use these kinds 
of question to impart legal-analysis skills, don't some values 
come along at the same time? 
Ultimately, the problem of values for the legal profession 
seems to always come aground on the deep contradiction be- 
tween the lawyer's role as loyal guardian of the client's interests 
and the lawyer's role as an officer of the court-as a guardian of 
justice. The problem emerges from the high value our society 
places on the rule of law while, at the same time, maintaining a 
certain skepticism about government (and, hence, law). The 
skepticism we have about government leads us to desire access, 
in times of need, to the services of independent legal represent- 
atives, advocates who will single-mindedly take our side. 
Therefore, even though it is widely acknowledged that the rule 
of law is essential to  the very survival of our system, when you 
put all of the MacCrate skills together, what you end up with is 
this: If your client is in a legal pickle, you have to try to get him 
out. Winning is the thing. It is not the private lawyer's pri- 
mary job to make sure the law's embedded values are put into 
force. 
This endemic conflict in the visions of the lawyer's role 
(loyal advocate for the client vs. officer of the court) perhaps 
means it would have been almost impossible for the MacCrate 
Report to address values more comprehensively. Arguably, 
then, the problem is not that it gives too little priority to values 
but rather, that, in its lengthy description of skills, it stealthily 
elevates the values of victory (for the client) over the values of 
truth, see John Humbach, Abuse of Confidentiality and Fabricated Controversy: 
Two Proposals, 11 PROF. LAW. 1 (2000). 
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"justice, fairness, and morality" that are embedded in the sub- 
stantive law itself. 
Stated in a different way, the MacCrate report devalues 
doctrine. To be sure, the report endorses the learning of doc- 
trine and the acquisition of skills in legal research and analysis, 
where doctrine is put to work. Essentially, though, the report 
treats the law's substantive prescriptions as just another tool in 
the lawyer's arsenal, as a resource to  serve clients interests-as 
just another tool to  win. It does not treat the law's substantive 
doctrines as the embodiment and sovereign expression of that 
true democracy-driven justice to which every citizen, especially 
lawyers, ought to loyally adhere and carry into effect. It is true, 
of course, that even democracy-driven justice can produce occa- 
sional laws that are "wrong" and run counter to some broader 
conception of "justice, fairness, and morality." But the operat- 
ing assumption in a democracy ought to be the opposite. In any 
case, the recognition that laws can be wrong hardly provides a 
general warrant to  frustrate their substantive intendment. 
Let me conclude with mention of a concrete case, one that I 
teach in my course in property law. In my thirty years of teach- 
ing property law, I have come to wonder at the number of cases 
in the casebooks where somebody is trying to assert some legal 
technicality or interpretation in an effort to take away some- 
body else's property rights-to get a result which, pretty mani- 
festly, would be at variance with most people's conceptions of 
"justice, fairness, and morality." What surprises most, as I re- 
flect on these cases, is how frequently the aggressors actually 
win. It sometimes seems to me that nobody's property is safe as 
long as there are sharp-eyed lawyers out there who are clever 
enough to figure out how to get it. Is there any chain of title 
that does not include at least one crucial deed or will which, 
with a little imagination, can be busted-or, at least, cast in 
enough of a shadow to pry loose a substantial settlement? At 
any rate, many, many property cases taught in law school are 
set up in exactly this sort of way. 
For a long time I simply accepted that this is the way it is. 
In our adversary system, we are not our brothers' keepers, and 
if there is a legal way to win, then winning must be right. More 
recently, though, I have begun asking my students "Is it mor- 
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ally right to try to win, to get somebody else's property away 
from them, just because you can?" 
The case I want to share here is a fairly recent case from 
New York's Court of Appeals, Symphony Space v. Pergola 
Properties, I n ~ . ~ 9  The case involved a real estate investor who 
wanted to donate the use of a theater in Manhattan to a not-for- 
profit corporation dedicated to the arts. Reduced to its essen- 
tials, the arrangement was this: The donor-investor transferred 
legal ownership of the building containing the theater to the 
not-for-profit, for a price of $10,010.00 (by the way, if you are 
unfamiliar with Manhattan real estate prices, that price was 
very low). As part of the deal the donor-investor leased back the 
non-theater portions of the building for $1 per year. Also, it was 
agreed that the donor would be entitled to get the building back 
in the future for a price roughly equal to the original $10,010 
plus an inflationary increment (a maximum of $28,000 after 25 
yearsh30 
What created the question was the investor's "option" to 
buy the property back. The non-for-profit sued to have the buy- 
back option declared invalid, and it won. The New York Court 
of Appeals, saying the case presented a "novel question,"31 held 
that the buy-back option was void under the rule against perpe- 
t u i t i e ~ . ~ ~  The effect of this legal victory was that the whole 
building became the permanent property of the not-for-profit, 
causing a financial loss of over $20 million to the investor that 
had been providing it with the free use of ~pace.3~ In short, the 
not-for-profit scored a $20 million chunk of property by getting 
a court to  nullify its side of an arrangement under which a ben- 
efactor had allowed it to use a theater for free. The not-for- 
29. 669 N.E.2d 799 (N.Y. 1996). 
30. Symphony Space, 669 N.E.2d a t  800-01. Actually, payment of all but $10 
of the purchase price was deferred, so the not-for-profit obtained the use of the 
space for, essentially, no out-of-pocket purchase price whatsoever. Id. The reason 
for the complex arrangement was so that no real estate taxes would have to be 
paid on the portion of the property used by the non-for-profit. Without this ar- 
rangement, use of the theater would have cost the not-for-profit (or somebody) 
$30,000 per year in real estate taxes-which, as a matter of state policy, the not- 
for-profit should not have to bear. N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW $420-a (McKimey 2000). 
31. Symphony Space, 669 N.E.2d at  800. 
32. N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW $9-1.1 (McKinney 2002). 
33. The original donor's successor in interest. Symphony Space, 669 N.E.2d 
a t  802. 
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profit's lawyers succeeded in obtaining this result by asserting a 
"novel q~estion"3~ concerning a technical point of law, a point 
which had blindsided everybody. 
Now, apart from the strictly property issues in this case 
(primarily, the application of New York's rule against perpetu- 
ities to commercial options), several other questions arise. 
First, it should be observed that the case turned on a particular 
interpretation of the option agreement, an interpretation that 
apparently was not necessitated by its language. In other 
words, even using the same substantive rules of law, the case 
could probably have been decided differently, thus preserving 
the rights of the investor. Specifically, instead of interpreting 
the option agreement as creating one single (and totally void) 
option with a number of exercise dates, the court could have 
interpreted it as creating four separate options-three of which 
would have been valid and one not. The buy-back agreement 
provided for option "closing" dates in the years 1987, 1993, 1998 
and 2003.35 Only the last of these four years (2003) could have 
run afoul of the rule against perpet~ities.3~ Since the other 
three "closing" years would all fall within the perpetuities pe- 
riod, and the Symphony Space case was decided in 1996, the 
"four-separate-options" interpretation would have left the in- 
vestor with time to exercise the third of the four options and 
avoid the expropriation. Instead, however, the Court of Appeals 
interpreted the agreement as creating a single option, which it 
then promptly declared to be unenforceable.37 In other words, 
faced with at least two possible interpretations of the agree- 
ment's language, the Court of Appeals picked the interpretation 
that made the buy-back void. 
The question that I address in class is this: Assuming the 
case could have been decided differently using the same law- 
that the option could have been interpreted as four separate op- 
tions, not one big void one-does it "promote justice, fairness, 
and morality" for a lawyer to argue for an interpretation that 
34. Id. at 800. 
35. Symphony Space, 669 N.E.2d at 801. It provided that the option could be 
exercised in certain other events, as well. Id. 
36. 'Where . . . the parties to a transaction are corporations and no measuring 
lives are stated in the instruments, the perpetuities period is simply 21 years." Id. 
at 806. 
37. Id. at 650. 
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would make the option unenforceable-to argue for an interpre- 
tation that would frustrate the agreement that the parties man- 
ifestly had in mind? Many of my students express the view that 
arguing for such an interpretation would be perfectly proper 
and, I suspect, most lawyers would agree. After all, isn't it the 
job of the other side to make the "four-separate-options" argu- 
ment, and up to the Court of Appeals to decide between the two? 
In the adversary system, the argument continues, the lawyers 
for the not-for-profit should worry only about maximizing the 
interests of the not-for-profit. 
Perhaps this is truly the system we have, and perhaps it is 
the best that can be devised. Yet, I would maintain, a primary 
reason for our profession's bad reputation is not that lawyers 
are "dishonest" (most are not), but that the public perceives that 
lawyers have no compunction a t  all about trying to get "wind- 
falls" for their own clients and care hardly one whit about "jus- 
tice, fairness, and morality" for anybody else. The public 
perceives that, in cases less dramatic than Symphony Space, 
lawyers frequently try to get their clients advantages (such as 
property rights) that they know very well their clients are not 
meant to have under the substance of the law. Scoring off a 
business counterpart or benefactor might be very clever, but 
only a lawyer is likely to think it is an example of "striving to 
promote justice, fairness, and m ~ r a l i t y . " ~ ~  As I like to ask my 
students, "Is this case okay by you? Does the profession get a 
better reputation when it manages to help people pry major 
pieces of property off of other people, all neatly within the rules 
of law and lawyer ethics?" 
There are also a number of follow-up questions, not directly 
presented by the Symphony Space case, but thought provoking 
for students. Suppose for example that, when the original thea- 
ter deal was being negotiated, the lawyers for the not-for-profit 
knew that the fourth closing year (2003) would run afoul of the 
rule against perpetuities, but they just sat by silently and let 
their client's benefactor poison its own buy-back deal. Would 
that make a difference? Or would the same lawyer  value^'^ ap- 
ply in that situation as well, viz. that in the adversary system 
we're not our brothers' keepers? Or, to take it further, suppose 
38. MacCrate Report, supra note 2, at 213 (Value 3 2). 
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the not-for-profit's own lawyers were the ones that proposed ad- 
ding the fourth closing year, 2003. Should that make a differ- 
ence? Should it matter whether the not-for-profit's lawyers 
knew they were proposing a provision that would make the buy- 
back fail? After all, one could argue, if the not-for-profit's law- 
yers did not make such a proposal, perhaps they would not be 
being quite as "loyal" to their client as they should, not going for 
the very best deal the other side was willing to agree to. Hmm. 
These and other subsidiary scenarios make the Symphony 
Space case a very fertile jumping-off point for examining the 
role of ethical considerations of "justice, fairness and morality" 
in the context of a lawyer's work, both as a litigator and as a 
negotiator. Looking at such scenarios is, I suppose, what is 
meant by teaching legal ethics by the "pervasive method." Each 
year I have students who think that the not-for-profit ought to 
get the whole building under all of the various scenarios, and 
others who think it should not win under any of the scenarios. 
Some see "taking advantage" of an obvious blunder as reprehen- 
sible, others as part of the lawyer's stock in trade. The question 
I have, in the end, is this: Which of them will make the better 
lawyers? 
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